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HOW TO PREPARE FOR AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 125

Norway’s municipalities would have to implement measures in a much shorter time

perspective. This poses a challenge to the municipalities; when can they expect the

climate change to occur, and at what pace will it occur? These are questions to which

there are no obvious answers, and that makes it challenging to plan and prepare for

a slow-burning crisis. Because of the gradual development of this type of crisis, it

does not gain the same attention as a fast-burning crisis. Given the uncertainties of

when the crisis begins or if there is a crisis at all, these crises tend to be normalised,

which means the extraordinary becomes the ordinary. Although climate change itself

might be considered a severe risk, the lack of means to reduce the risks and mitigate

against the impacts, in addition to the ambiguity over when the crisis will occur,

means this type of risk might not be prioritised on a local level. Municipalities simply

lack the knowledge to meet such a challenge.

Challenges of including black swans in risk and vulnerability

analysis

The lack of proper means to meet the threat of more severe weather also applies to

the risk- analysis tools available to municipalities. Traditional risk analysis tools

estimate risk on the basis of probabilities and consequences – a perspective used to

estimate risks on the municipality level (Furevik, 2012). However, an increasing

number of researchers and risk analysts find the probability-based perspective on

risk too narrow, and believe it ignores and conceals important aspects of risk and

uncertainty. In recent years, several perspectives on risk have been developed where

probability is replaced by consequences and uncertainty in their definitions (Aven,

2015; Aven and Krohn, 2014; Aven, Renn and Rosa, 2011). These perspectives

regard probability as a tool to describe uncertainty, and suggest that the concept of

risk extends beyond this and its evaluation should therefore not be limited to this

tool. They also claim that more weight should be attached to the knowledge

dimension, the unforeseen and potential surprises, than is allowed for in traditional

perspectives. A key point is that the probabilities could be the same in two situations,

but the knowledge and strength of knowledge supporting the probabilities could be

completely different. These perspectives are proposed for use in the risk

management of “black swan” incidents (Aven, 2015) because traditional

perspectives to risk cannot capture the complexity of such risks, given the lack of

knowledge associated with these risks.

The metaphor and concept of the

black swan

has gained a lot of attention

recently and is a hot topic in many forums that discuss safety and risk. In the

scientific community, it has also come under scrutiny following the publication of

Nassib Taleb's book, “The Black Swan”. Taleb refers to a black swan as an event

that has the following three attributes: First, it is an outlier, as it lies outside the realm

of regular expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its

possibility. Second, it carries an extreme impact. Third, despite its outlier status, in

hindsight, people come up with explanations for its occurrence after the event,

making it explainable and, importantly, predictable.